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驯龙高手2如何在开放中增强韧性？从项目安全走向资产网络安全_我的网站
A |  In economics, overcapacity is a dynamic and relative concept. Supply-demand balance is temporary, and imbalance is the norm. The Western narrative that equates the sheer scale of China's production capacity directly with "overcapacity" is, frankly, economically illiterate. It conflates size with pathology. Consider the math. China's manufacturing sector accounts for roughly 30 percent of global manufacturing value-added - a dominance unmatched since the post-war US. Yet this reflects not overcapacity but competitive capacity. The critics ignore that China's trade surplus in 2025 reached a record $1.2 trillion, roughly equivalent to the GDP of a top-20 economy like Saudi Arabia. They ignore that Chinese exports carry high import content - foreign value-added accounts for nearly half of gross export value - meaning China's capacity integrates global supply chains rather than displacing them. The judgment lacks rigor because it applies a static snapshot to a dynamic system. It assumes that if China produces more than it currently consumes domestically, the surplus is automatically "overcapacity." Nonsense. By that logic, Germany's persistent trade surplus in automobiles and machinery would constitute chronic overcapacity. It does not, because German capacity serves global demand. So does China's. The narrative isn't economics. It's politics dressed in economic jargon. Western critics attribute the price advantages of Chinese green technology products to "government subsidies" and "market distortion." This is a convenient story. It is also wrong. The global competitiveness of China's green technology industries stems from four interconnected factors: massive domestic market scale, decades of sustained infrastructure investment, a highly educated STEM workforce, and fierce intra-industry competition. China's NEV purchase-tax exemptions, extended through 2027, total approximately 520 billion yuan ($77.05 billion). Substantial? Yes. But causally linked to overcapacity? No. The causal chain critics imagine - subsidies → artificial competitiveness → overproduction - collapses under scrutiny. The EU's IPCEI battery programs allocated over 6 billion euros, plus EIB financing. The US CHIPS Act appropriated $54.2 billion for semiconductors, while the Inflation Reduction Act funnels hundreds of billions into clean energy. All major economies subsidize strategic industries. The difference is that China converted subsidies into systemic efficiency: its nominal lithium-ion cell capacity reached approximately 2.2 TWh by end-2023, driving global average battery pack prices down 20 percent year-on-year to $115 per kilowatt-hour in 2024. That is not distortion. That's innovation at scale. Chinese firms filed 20,081 European patent applications in 2024 - 10.1 percent of the total, with battery technology patents surging 79 percent year-on-year. Patents reflect innovation, not subsidy dependency. The causal link between subsidies and overcapacity is weak; the link between scale, innovation, and competitiveness is robust. Meanwhile, global demand for green and low-carbon transition is experiencing explosive growth. The International Energy Agency projects that renewable capacity additions must triple by 2030 to meet Paris Agreement targets. In this context, labeling China's wind, photovoltaic, and battery capacity as "overcapacity" is not merely wrong - it is dangerously counterproductive. In fact, China's capacity has played an indispensable role in advancing the global energy transition. Chinese solar module production costs have fallen roughly 90 percent over the past decade. Goldman Sachs Research notes that China manufactured approximately 86 percent of global solar modules, 80 percent of lithium-ion batteries, and 68 percent of electric vehicles in 2024. This is not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets; it is capacity the world desperately needs. The "overcapacity" label assumes a zero-sum game where Chinese production crowds out others. The reality is synergistic: Chinese capacity lowers global clean energy costs, enabling faster deployment worldwide. The "overcapacity" label holds only if one believes the world should slow decarbonization to protect less competitive producers and to empower those that deliberately employ "burn, baby, burn" tactics. That's industrial protectionism intersecting with brown imperialism, and it's disproportionately impacting the Global South, which is more vulnerable to climate breakdown, precisely when it's finally trying to shake off centuries of systemic Western exploitation and suppression. Furthermore, the disparity in how the West treats its own industrial policy versus China's is glaring. When the US funnels $52.7 billion through the CHIPS Act for semiconductors, or when the EU subsidizes Airbus, or when American agricultural subsidies distort global food markets, the silence from Western media is deafening. When China gains an edge in manufacturing, it faces media offensives and policy restrictions. This is not inconsistency. This is strategy. The underlying motivation is the "China threat" rubric - a framework that treats China's development itself as a danger to the Western-led order. Countries wagging their fingers at China do so not because China violates economic rules they themselves follow, but because China succeeds under rules they once wrote to their own advantage. These accusers possess their own national industrial policies and subsidies. They have long exploited historical and contemporary advantages against China and developing countries. They have not competed well, have not provided themselves with good governance, and have not invested adequately in their own infrastructure, education, and R&D. They have allowed their own leading industries to seek monopolistic positions detrimental not only to others but to their own consumers. Rather than reform themselves, they blame China. In these contexts, the cry of "China Shock 2.0" is the latest iteration of an old playbook: frame China's development as a threat to global stability rather than a contribution to global progress. The claim that China's advances in renewable energy and AI will send more serious shock waves than traditional manufacturing displacement is analytically flawed and politically motivated. First, the premise is false. China is not reducing the market share of developed countries through unfair means; it is outcompeting them through innovation, scale, and efficiency. According to Goldman Sachs Research, China's "new three" green technology sectors alone contributed around one percentage point to the country's 5.4 percent nominal export growth in 2025. This is competitive capacity serving global demand, not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets. Second, the "shock" framing ignores history. China maintained production and trade flows in 2020 while major Western economies crashed, providing essential goods to global markets, likely saving millions of lives while mitigating what would have been greater global economic harm. The "shock" is not to the global economy; it is to Western complacency. Third, the argument is self-contradictory. The critics want China to be simultaneously weak enough to dismiss and strong enough to fear. If China's high-tech development is genuinely formidable - so innovative and efficient that it threatens to displace developed economies - then it is delivering precisely the technological progress the world needs to meet climate goals. Restricting it through tariffs and barriers would harm global innovation, raise energy costs for developing countries, and slow decarbonization. The critics would be sacrificing the planet to protect their own complacency. "China Shock 2.0" is a rhetorical device to justify protectionism. It replaces engagement with containment, competition with confrontation. The world does not need another shock doctrine. It needs cooperation, investment, and the recognition that China's rise is not a threat but an opportunity - for green transition, for technological progress, for shared prosperity, and for a shared future. The author is a professor of politics and international relations and director of the Center for Ecological Civilization at East China Normal University in Shanghai. [email protected] 。 随着高水平对外开放深入推进，中国企业海外布局已从产品出口和项目投资，逐步扩展到资源权益、生产设施、研发平台、知识产权、数据系统、品牌渠道和物流网络建设等多种形态。海外资产安全的内涵也随之发生变化。过去，海外投资安全主要关注东道国政治稳定、项目可持续经营以及人员和财产保护等。
B | 当前，在全球产业链重构、产业政策竞争加剧和国际经贸规则分化的背景下，海外项目即使经营正常，也可能由于关键产能过度集中或者因东道国规则调整受到不同程度的冲击。 联合国贸发会议指出，地缘政治分化、贸易碎片化和产业政策竞争正在重塑全球投资流向。近期，部分国家的政策调整具有警示意义。这提示我们：即使企业已经形成规模、成本和产业配套优势，只要资源获取、加工和关键中间品产能高度依赖同一东道国，其政策变化仍可能同时波及多个项目，并沿上下游产业链传导。
C | 不仅如此，中国企业海外资产布局中的三类结构性风险值得关注。
D | 因此，海外资产安全保障不能止于维持单个项目的持续经营，还应着眼于有效提升整个资产网络的韧性。 中国企业全球资产布局面临三类结构性风险 一是关键产业链空间集中所带来的系统性风险。产业集聚可以降低成本、共享基础设施共享和上下游协同。但当资源获取、生产加工、物流运输和关键中间品等功能持续集中于少数国家、地区或制度体系集中时，效率优势也可能会转化为结构性脆弱。一旦东道国调整政策，影响的不只是个别企业，而是多个相互关联的生产环节，冲击还会沿供应链传导至其他海外节点乃至国内产业。
E | 企业依据市场条件作出的区位选择本身是理性的。但当大量企业作出相似选择，产业层面就可能形成短期内难以替代的功能集中。判断海外布局是否安全，不能只看资产分布于多少个国家，还要看不可替代的资源、技术、加工和市场功能是否集中在少数节点。 二是海外投资深度嵌入所带来的战略回旋空间收窄风险。深度嵌入东道国有助于企业降低成本、建立合作关系并形成产业优势，但嵌入越深，调整区位和重新配置资产的成本可能越高。
F | 矿山、工业园、港口和能源设施等重资产项目，投资规模大、建设周期长，并与特定资源、基础设施和监管体系紧密相连。项目建成后，设备迁移、原料替换和产能转移都会受到很强的约束。如果企业在投资时只考虑如何进入，而没有预先考虑如何调整、替代和退出，已经形成的海外资产就可能由企业能力的载体转化为限制战略选择的约束。其影响不再局限于单个项目经营，而可能削弱我国对海外重要资产的保护、控制和再配置能力，压缩应对资源、产业和国际环境变化的战略空间。 三是海外资产链高度关联所带来的制度风险跨境传导风险。中国企业的海外生产基地可能使用第三国技术和设备，通过国际金融中心融资，由跨国物流网络运输，最终面向多个市场销售。股权、技术、资金、数据、供应链和市场等联系，把地理上分散的资产连接成一个跨国网络。
G | 此时，一国贸易、投资、技术、数据或市场准入规则变化，可能沿企业控制关系和产业联系传导到其他国家。企业将产能转移至新的国家，可以分散地理风险，却未必能同步实现制度风险的分散。在东道国合法经营，也不意味着其技术来源、融资渠道和产品市场不受其他法域规则影响。海外资产联系越广、结构越复杂，局部制度冲击越可能演化为资产网络的联动风险。 多措并举，着力提高海外资产网络韧性 应对上述三类风险，需要在扩大高水平对外开放的同时，提高中国企业海外资产的配置质量和动态调整能力。 一是建立海外资产网络风险识别机制。除掌握投资规模、项目数量和经营收益之外，还要摸清资源、生产、研发、物流、数据、融资和市场等关键功能的全球分布及相互依赖关系。围绕重点产业开展压力测试，模拟单一国家政策调整、关键园区停产、物流通道中断、主要市场准入收紧等情景，评估资产网络的持续运营能力。
H | 二是把资产可调整性纳入海外投资决策前端。对建设周期长、区位专用性强的项目，在投资阶段同步评估资产集中度、设备可迁移性、供应替代性和退出成本，推广分阶段投资、模块化建设、多来源供应和备用物流安排。
I | 政策性金融和保险支持也应把项目的调整、替代和退出能力作为重要考量，防止短期成本优势固化为长期资产锁定。 三是健全制度风险跨境传导预警机制。海外投资风险评估既要分析东道国营商环境，也要关注技术来源地、融资结算地、数据存储地和产品销售地的相关规则，识别各类资产联系及其风险传导路径。应整合驻外机构、行业部门、金融保险机构和专业服务机构的信息，形成重点行业规则数据库、风险传导图谱和情景预案。 四是构建功能互补的全球资产组合。多元化布局不应是同类项目的简单分散，而应由不同节点分别承担核心生产、区域市场、弹性增产、技术研发和应急储备等功能。企业还应扩大本地就业，培育当地供应商，加强人才培训和环境治理，使海外项目更好融入东道国经济社会，为资产持续运营夯实社会基础。 中国企业更好走向世界，既要有进入全球市场、配置全球资源的能力，也要有随国际环境变化及时调整，保护资产、维持经营和重新配置资源的能力。为此，海外资产安全保障应从单个项目延伸到资产网络，在开放中增强韧性，在发展中筑牢安全屏障。这是推动统筹高水平开放和高水平安全的重要着力点。
J | （张思 刘梦 汪寿阳 作者单位：中国科学院大学经济与管理学院）。 Current article:http://zaimf.guiruaxianuyayecou.buzz/2s0u/20260826/17182.html Published on:01:17:04 |
